According to a draft paper by the European Commission, the EU would open its market to candidate countries in proportion to their support for the EU’s foreign policy objectives. An earlier access to the single market will also depend on whether they refrain from transferring key technologies to hostile states and trade competitors. Under the plan, Ukraine, Moldova, Albania and Montenegro will be offered a roadmap to accelerate the accession process.

In other words, candidate countries will be offered unprecedented gradual integration into the EU’s single market, including frictionless trade and access to research programmes while their applications are being assessed. All they need to do is to refrain from befriending countries such as Russia and China. Another gift for Kyiv from Brussels and, another challenge for current member states.

The opportunity of joining the EU (and its single market) will definitely be a ’treasures chamber’ for war-torn Ukraine given the incredible economic benefits this situation would provide the country, but what will all this mean to Member States, especially those less prosperous on the eastern part of the EU that would need more support from the bloc’s budget?

When assessing the potential economic impact of enlargement with Ukraine, it is important to start with a figure, mentioned in a Commission paper back in 2023. Integrating Ukraine into the bloc could mean some €186 billion in EU funds flowing to the country over seven years. This estimation is still valid and based on the next facts.

Once Ukraine joins the EU, the country would have a fifth of EU agricultural land. This would imply that Ukraine will become the largest beneficiary of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Given its population (40 million), Kyiv would have considerable influence in the European Parliament and the Council of the EU. Once Ukraine be a member of the EU, it will have one of the lowest GDPs.

According to calculations, Ukraine – a large beneficiary of EU funds with a low GDP – would put massive strain on the bloc’s cohesion policy. It is about funding that flows from richer regions to poorer areas.

The key indicator on which the distribution of cohesion policy funds is based is the level of GDP per capita of each region compared to the EU average. The accession of new countries would significantly lower the average, leading to a reclassification of some regions: many of those currently classified as ’less developed’ – i.e., their GDP per capita is less than 75% of the EU average, and therefore receive more funding – would move to the ’transition’ category , while some ’transition’ regions would be considered ’more developed’ (above the EU average), and would therefore see their available funds reduced, according to an analysis by Bruegel Institute. The study also says that, the greatest losses would be suffered by Italian and Spanish regions, with reductions of almost €9 billion overall for each country, followed by Portuguese, Hungarian, and Romanian regions.

Concluding, Ukraine’s EU membership, will surely result in reduction in revenue in case of both net contributors and net beneficiaries, however, the situation would be worse in the ’less developed’ member states, which would need more support. According to current rules, countries like Bulgaria, Romania, Greece, Slovenia and others would receive less fundings and could even become net contributors once Ukraine joins the EU.

In a worst-case scenario, Europe must be prepared for a partial economic crisis, taking into consideration the negative impacts on national economies after the last enlargement in 2004 when the accession of 10 new members resulted in a decline in EU average in revenue by 13% and less funding for more than 20 million people in Spain, Portugal and Greece. In order to avoid a similar crisis, Ukraine’s EU membership, especially, a fast-track accession, should be reconsidered, in addition, reforms would be needed within the EU itself, prior to Ukraine’s accession. Otherwise, not only current member states’ economies can easily be under enormous pressure, but these capitals’ trust in the EU could also be weakened.

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