With the opening of the EU accession negotiations with Ukraine in December 2023, considerable attention has been paid to some key areas such as rule of law, while some other important issues seems to be pushed into the background. Of these areas, meeting EU environmental and climate goals, a key point for Brussels, cannot be even seen on Ukraine’s accession horizon despite the fact that Kyiv has committed to gradually implement the energy and climate acquis and the Ukrainian government officially approved its negotiating position for Cluster 4 (which includes Chapter 27) in December 2025. In addition, in June, Ukraine joined the European Encironment Agency (EEA) as a cooperating country to build technical foundations for environmental data reporting. (In EU enlargement negotiations environment protection is covered under Chapter 27 – “Environment and Climate Change”, which is part of Claster 4 – “Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity.”)

Given that Chapter 27 is traditionally one of the most difficult in the process of European integration, partly because it is closely connected to the bloc’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), it is worth looking into the details. Due to its general importance, Chapter 27 is also the one, under which the largest number of so-called transition measures are applied. It includes key issues such as wastewater treatment, extended producer responsibility systems, separate waste collection and recycling infrastructure and many more.

To understand how exactly EU candidate Ukraine performs in this respective area and whether there is an improvement, we must look beyond not only the reform checklist but also some EU reports on this field which sometimes reflect a highly tolerant stance towards the war-torn country. Ukraine works progressively towards meeting the entry conditions, even under the difficult circumstances of the war, EU reports claim. The question is whether this is true.

As part of requirements to comply with and implement EU acquis in agriculture, Ukraine should pay particular attention to regulation of markets and standards in farming practices including those regarding the use of chemical fertilizers, animal and plant health, food safety, and environmental welfare. It should be noted that the potential additional compliance costs from EU accession – an estimated additional 10 percent of the total costs – may undercut Ukraine’s agricultural competitiveness. The question is, why Ukraine would rush to take the necessary steps under these circumstamces, against its own interest. Given the EU requirement to use organic fertilizers instead of chemical ones, to apply climate-smart agricultural technologies, and to start programs for energy saving in agriculture to help reduce the amount of farm CO2 emissions, Ukraine is facing incredible challenges and the probability to meet all the EU standards by the established deadline is very low, largely due to the fact that these regulations require huge investment in several areas including clean energy, market integration, various management and monitoring systems and many others.

Without particular emphasis on practical application of environmental legislation, there is a risk that adaptation will remain largely formal. Given that Ukraine is simultaneously fighting a full-scale war with Russia, rebuilding its infrastructure and economy, adding that the war has caused extensive dam-age to its land, water systems, air quality and protected areas, and preparing for a rapid EU integration, achieving full compliance with EU environmental law, realistically, is nothing but a dream. In addition, it also should be noted that, since Ukrainian agriculture and industry operate under very different regulatory conditions than those applied in the EU, there is a risk of a ‘regulatory flip-flop’ where Ukraine might receive an exemption a few years later not only in agricultural issues including food safety but also decarbonisation and overall environmental protection. And, this has nothing to do with a traditional merit-based process.

To see how unrealistic Ukraine’s goals in climate goals are, it is enough to mention the example of Ukraine’s 2030 emission reduction target compared to 1990 (minus 65 percent) which is more ambitious than the EU’s target (minus 55 percent). Given this example, it should be stressed that, both unrealistic promises on the part of Ukraine and unrealistic goals and biased reports on behalf of the EU should be avoided. Most importantly, it would be crucial to admit by both parties that, Ukraine cannot meet the environmental requirements. That would be a fair response to this unpleasant situation.

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